While firms participation in collective bargaining contracts has been decreasing over the last two decades, orientation at collectively bargained wages without formal commitment increased in popularity. This article raises the question whether orientation at collectively bargained wages is observed on the pathway out of bargaining contracts or serves as a stepping stone to bargaining contracts. Dynamic non-linear panel estimation applied to data from the IAB Establishment Panel reveals some modest support in favor of the stepping stone hypothesis. However, transitions from bargaining orientation to formal bargaining contracts cannot compensate for the overall decline in formal collective bargaining participation. Instead, the decline in formal participation and the opposing rise in orientation are mostly due to a changing establishment composition rather than behavioral transitions.
Introduction
In Europe, collective bargaining between employers' associations and unions plays an important role for wage setting and has a long-lasting tradition for industrial relations. The German case, which I study in this article, used to be a role model for other countries. It is characterized by unions that bargain over wages for all workers of the same occupation within the same industry. Since unions even bargain for non-members, a wide range of workers is covered by collectively bargained wages, as long as their respective employer participates in the bargaining process through the respective industry-specific employers' association. Economically and politically, collective bargaining is assessed to be beneficial as it reduces transaction costs of wage bargaining, reduces the potential for conflicts between employers and employees, and implements minimum standards for wages and working conditions.
In Germany, industry-wide collective bargaining used to be the standard model. However, firm-level bargaining contracts as well as orientation at collectively bargained wages without a formal contract coexist as alternative bargaining regimes in the German labor market. While industry-wide collective bargaining coverage has been decreasing over the last 20 years, the number of firms orientating at collectively bargained wages without formal commitment has been steadily rising during the same period (Addison et al. 2016) . Firms can leave collective bargaining contracts by quitting their membership at the respective employers' association without justification. Moreover, and certainly because of the decreasing firm disposition towards collective bargaining, many employers' associations started offering membership options that do not require the application of the respective collective bargaining contracts. Hence, employers can easily switch the remuneration strategy by leaving or joining collective bargaining contracts, or they can just claim a pure orientation at collectively bargained wages without any formal commitment.
So far, the role of orientation at collectively bargained wages is not fully understood. Visser (2006) argues that the decrease in German collective bargaining coverage is largely offset by an increase in employers orientating at collectively bargained wages without formal commitment. However, the results in Addison et al. (2016) show that this is only partially true as the number of orientating firms does not fully offset the decline in the formal participation in bargaining contracts. Moreover, average wages at firms with bargaining orientation fall short of average wages at fully committed firms (Addison et al. 2016 ). These results indicate that orientation at collective bargaining does not fully compensate for the declining role of formal collective bargaining commitment.
In this article, I exploit information of the IAB Establishment Panel, which is a large annual panel dataset with information about participation in bargaining regimes since 2000. To analyze the role of orientation at collectively bargained wages without formal commitment, I show how the rise in its use relates to the decline in formal collective bargaining coverage, both at the worker and the workplace level. In a second step, I analyze differences in worker remuneration under these bargaining regimes using linked administrative employee data (LIAB). The linked employer-employee structure allows estimating the wage differential from individual wages while controlling for workplace and worker characteristics.
However, the effectiveness of orientation at collectively bargained wages does not solely depend on whether such firms keep up in wage levels. A more relevant question is whether orientation at collectively bargained wages serves as a causal channel on the pathway into full adoption of a collective bargaining contract. The underlying strategy is that firms start by aligning wage levels to collectively bargained wages in a period of probation before they join a binding collective bargaining contract. By contrast, when looking at the descriptive decline in collective bargaining coverage there is a clear counter hypothesis that firms may align wage levels after they left the formal commitment. In this case orientation at collective bargaining would be observed on the pathway out of full commitment. To shed light on these competing hypotheses, I analyze establishment-level transitions between bargaining regimes in a dynamic panel framework. Controlling for time-constant establishment heterogeneity, I
isolate the causal effect of the bargaining regime in year t-1 on the bargaining regime in year t.
So far, there is only one other study by Addison et al. (2016) that empirically addresses the role of orientation at collectively bargained wages. The authors estimate average wage differences between bargaining regimes at the level of firms and descriptively analyze transitions between bargaining regimes. I add four major contributions to the existing literature: First, when estimating wage differentials between bargaining regimes, I contribute by re-estimating the wage differentials of Addison et al. (2016) from administrative linked employer-employee data. These data allow for an analysis of individual wages and hence to control for individual-level heterogeneity. Second, I provide the first study that analyzes causal transitions between bargaining regimes from a dynamic non-linear panel model. Third, I contribute with a comprehensive decomposition of participation in bargaining regimes over the last 15 years. I decompose observed changes into a compositional and a behavioral component.
While the former (compositional) implies that different plants arrive in the market that are no more formally covered, the latter (behavioral) implies that transitions between bargaining regimes explain the changing participation rates. As it turns out, the establishment composition plays a significant role for the decline in collective bargaining participation and the rise in orientation at collective bargaining without formal commitment. Fourth and finally, I complement the explanation of the increase (decrease) in bargaining orientation (collective bargaining participation) by Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions using observable firm-level characteristics.
Data

The IAB Establishment Panel
The major data source for my analyses is the IAB Establishments Panel, which is a large annual panel survey comprising between 15,000 and 16,000 establishment observations in each panel wave. The gross population of the survey is the full administrative population of all establishments located in Germany with at least one employee liable to social security contributions. A high data quality is ensured by a cost intensive interviewing process, in which trained interviewers visit the workplaces to compile the surveys. The survey collects information on labor demand and labor processes including the presence of industrial relations at the workplace. A unique establishment identifier allows tracking establishments over time as long as they continue to participate in the survey. The continuation response rate is about 83 percent each year leading to a stable survey panel that allows for dynamic panel analyses.
Comprehensive data descriptions are presented by Ellguth et al. (2014) and Fischer et al. (2009) .
Moreover, a comparison of the IAB Establishment Panel with the full administrative population of plants shows that participation in the survey is random in observable characteristics (Bossler et al. 2017 ).
Analysis samples
For the analysis, I restrict the sample to the period from 2000 to 2014. I start the dynamic analysis in 2000 as this is the first panel year for which lagged information (of 1999) on the orientation at collectively bargained wages is available. I end the sample period in 2014 because recent literature points at the possibility that the introduction of the statutory minimum wage in 2015 has influenced the orientation at collectively bargained contracts but not the explicit participation in bargaining contracts (Ellguth and Kohaut 2016) .
I exclude the public sector using both the sector classification and the legal form of firms. The public sector is in most cases automatically covered by an own collective bargaining contract and therefore there is no decision of whether to join or leave a collective bargaining agreement. Finally, I restrict the sample to establishments with at least five employees over the period of analysis. The last sample restriction is important since employees in small firms (defined by fewer than five employees) do not have the right to found a works councils, making these establishments special in their industrial relations.
Moreover, the wage setting in small firms is very individualized (Brenzel et al. 2014) . Hence, transaction cost advantages of collective bargaining may be limited in small firms. [ Figure 1 about here]
Descriptive statistics
The major variable of interest in the analysis captures the current bargaining regime of the respective workplace. It allows a distinction between participation in a legally binding (industry-wide) collective bargaining contract, participation in a firm-specific (legally binding) bargaining contract, orientation at collectively bargained wages, or no bargaining coverage at all. Panel (a) of Figure 1 displays the descriptive pattern of employee coverage by these four categories over time, where no coverage is the residual category. The displayed coverage is weighted by the number of employees at the respective establishments and therefore allows an interpretation at the worker-level, i.e., for the fraction of workers that is covered by a particular regime. This does not imply that all these workers are paid a collectively bargained wage, as such bargaining contracts provide minimum standards which can be exceeded but not undercut (Jung and Schnabel 2011) . It follows that the displayed fraction of workers falls under the minimum standards of the respective bargaining contract that applies to the respective establishment.
[ Figure 1 about here] Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows that the fraction of employees covered by a formal industry-wide collective bargaining contract steadily fell from 60 percent in 2000 to 44 percent in 2014. By contrast, the fraction of employees at workplaces that orient wages at collectively bargained contracts rose in the same period from 18 to 28 percent. Finally, the fraction of workers covered by a firm-specific bargaining contract remained stable in the time window between 2000 and 2014. Together, these descriptive time series indicate a decrease in formal collective bargaining coverage and an increase in orientation at collectively bargained wages. However, when comparing these fractions, the increase in orientation does not fully compensate for the decline in formal coverage.
The decline in formal coverage and rise in orientation could be explained by two potential mechanisms. 
Wage differences by bargaining regimes
In the next step of the analysis, I follow Addison (2016) and compare wages under these bargaining regimes. It allows a judgement on whether wages of firms with an orientation at collectively bargained wages match up with wages at formally participating firms. Since a loose orientation at collectively bargained wages without formal contract comes along with more flexible wage setting, it is an empirical question to what extent wages align with otherwise similar but formally participating plants. In contrast to Addison et al. (2016) , I use linked worker-level administrative data for this purpose. Besides potentially confounding firm characteristics, the data additionally allow me to control for individual heterogeneity, i.e., individual characteristics that capture differences between employees under different bargaining regimes. Together, this steup controls for selection into firms based on individual-level observables.
Other studies mostly identify such wage effects from establishment-level switches between bargaining regimes using fixed effects or difference-in-difference methods (Addison et al. 2015; Addison et al. 2016; Gürtzgen 2016) . Of course, this identification strategy is more promising when someone is interested in causal effects of changing bargaining regimes. However, it is also very restrictive as switches between bargaining regimes may -due to wage rigidities within workplaces (Stüber 2017) -not instantaneously affect wages to change. Moreover, if switches are endogenous, wages may already be adjusted before switching regimes. Very much in line with this argument, Gürtzgen (2016) does not find evidence for a trend adjusted wage effect.
Given the shortcomings of identification through switches and the purpose of this section to present rather descriptive but conditional wage differentials, I rely on the following wage equation
in which the log individual daily wage at time t is explained by the bargaining regime of establishment j at time t conditional on establishment-level controls , individual controls , and a time effect .
[ Table 1 about here]
The results are displayed in Table 1 . (e) displays differentials in wage growth. Column (1) presents descriptive differences without controlling for any covariates. Workers at plants that orient at collectively bargained wages on average receive 0.18 log-points lower wages compared with uncovered establishments. Average wages are 0.58 log-points higher at plants covered by collective bargaining contracts and about 0.63 log-points higher at plants covered by a firm-level contract. However, these average differences are likely to be codetermined by characteristics of the plant and non-random matching of workers to plants. Hence, column (2) controls for plant characteristics and column (3) controls for worker-level characteristics. In both cases the shrinking differences imply that plants with high paying firm-characteristics as well as individuals with highly paid characteristics are more likely covered by bargaining regimes. Column (4), which controls for plant and worker characteristics, hence provides wage differentials of -based on observables -similar plants and similar workers. On average orientation at collectively bargained wages pays workers 0.06 log-points above the uncovered plants, collective bargaining contracts pay about 0.13 log-points higher wages, and firm-level bargaining contracts pay about 0.11 log-points higher wages.
When looking at different quantiles across the conditional wage distributions in Panels ( Finally, Panel (e) of Table 1 displays differentials in wage growth defined as the log-points difference
. Orientation at collectively bargained wages could well imply an orientation at negotiated growth rates, but not at levels. Despite of column (2), all regressions demonstrate a significantly lower wage growth in firms reporting an orientation at collectively bargained wages compared with formally participating plants. Demonstrating that differences in wage growth lead to the observed level differences.
The wage regressions imply that wage differentials conditional on worker-and plant-level characteristics are larger at formally binding contracts compared with otherwise similar plants that orient at collectively bargained wages. Moreover, these wage differentials are relatively more pronounced in the lower tail of the conditional wage distributions. These results corroborate the findings of Addison et al. (2016) that wages of plants orientating at collectively bargained wages do not fully match up with formally covered plants.
Transitions between bargaining regimes Descriptive transitions
Before analyzing causal transitions between the four bargaining regimes no coverage, orientation at collective bargaining, (industry-wide) collective bargaining, and firm-specific bargaining, I present a suggestive description of transitions across and of the persistence within these regimes. Table 2 presents two descriptive transition matrices. Panel (a) presents relative transition rates as of the bargaining regimes in t-1. By contrast, Panel (b) splits up the states in t-1 as of each bargaining regime in t.
[ Table 2 about here]
Panel (a) of Table 2 shows that of the uncovered establishments in t-1, 75 percent remain uncovered in t, 20 percent report an orientation at collectively bargained wages, and about 5 percent adopt a bargaining contract (either an industry-wide contract or a firm-specific contract). Of the plants orientating at collectively bargained wages in t-1 a fraction of even 13 percent adopts a formal bargaining contract (10 percent in industry-wide contracts and 3 percent in a firm-specific contract).
Another 21 percent move into the state without any bargaining coverage. Of the plants with an industrywide collective bargaining contract in t-1, 85 percent remain in such contracts and another 8 percent turn to an orientation at collectively bargained wages. These numbers points at a larger fraction of plants adopting bargaining contracts through orientation compared with plants abolishing full commitment through orientation. However, this may not be a causal observation. In fact, these transitions and dependencies may be co-determined by observable and unobservable heterogeneity instead of genuine true dependencies. To analyze whether there are causal pathways in and out of formal commitment, I
disentangle true state dependence and cross state dependencies from spurious correlations, i.e., spurious state dependence.
Estimation strategy
The model that identifies the (true) state dependence of interest explains the latent propensity y of establishment j to be in a state ! in period t:
The major explanatory variable of interest is the establishment's state in t-1. The model further controls for time-varying observables and time-constant establishment-level heterogeneity & # . As simple fixed effect estimation is practically infeasible in latent variable models, and moreover, it is inconsistent in a dynamic panel approach, I follow the standard state dependence literature (Immervoll et al. 2015; Lechmann and Wunder 2016) and model the unobserved heterogeneity as a function of establishmentlevel averages of the covariates and a time-constant establishment-level random effect:
where ̅ are establishment-level averages of the covariates -so called Mundlak terms -and ) # is a time-constant establishment-level random effect.
However, inserting equation (3) into equation (2) does not consistently estimate the effects of interest.
The estimates may be biased as soon as the initial periods' bargaining state of plant j, which is " * , is correlated with the random effect ) # . This is because the initial state " * remains left over when inserting all previous lagged equations into equation (2 
After inserting equation (4) into the equation of interest (2), the model can be consistently estimated using a multinomial logit specification with a plant specific random effect ) # for each state !.
Multinomial logit specifies the probability of plant j to be in state y=s in period t as follows: 
I follow recent state dependence literature (Immervoll et al. 2015; Lechmann and Wunder 2016) and define true state dependence (in collective bargaining contracts) as the difference between:
(a) the probability of participating in collective bargaining contracts in t conditional on being in the same state in t-1 and (b) the probability of participating in collective bargaining contracts in t conditional on being in some reference state (no coverage) in t-1, both conditional on control variables and the parameters described in equation (4) 
Given that equation (5) fully captures the unobserved heterogeneity specified in model (2), this TSD can be interpreted as the causal effect of participation in a collective bargaining contract in t-1 on being in a collective bargaining contract in t.
Accordingly, cross state dependence is defined as the difference between the probability of being in a collective bargaining contract in t conditional on the state of interest (orientation at collective bargaining) in t-1 and the probability of being in a collective bargaining contract in t conditional on some reference category (no coverage) in t-1: refrain from control variables such as profits or wages that may be affected by bargaining participation (Addison et al. 2015; Gürtzgen 2009 ). Similarly, I cannot control for variables such as working time, which is directly regulated in bargaining contracts, or innovative activity that may also be affected by collective bargaining participation (Addison et al. 2017 ). Table 3 presents baseline estimates of the TSD, which measures persistence in each of the bargaining regimes, and the CSD, which quantifies causal transitions between each of the bargaining regimes. The effects in Table 3 are retrieved from a model as formulated in equation (5), but they do not yet consider potentially confounding control variables.
Empirical results
[ Table 3 about here]
The percentage point CSD of transitions into no bargaining coverage is negative for all other bargaining regimes (orientation at collective bargaining, industry-wide collective bargaining, firm-specific bargaining). These negative effects indicate a strong positive state dependence in the state without any bargaining commitment. Moreover, the effect of collective bargaining commitment being most negative implies that firms from the other two regimes more likely move to no bargaining coverage. Since also transitions from industry-wide bargaining commitment into orientation at collective bargaining are least likely (column 2), there seems to be a cyclical pattern of transitions between no coverage and orientation at collective bargaining orientation.
On the diagonal, the TSD effects show a strong positive persistence in all bargaining regimes, which is particularly pronounced in industry-wide bargaining contracts, but also remarkable concerning persistence in orientation at collective bargaining. The persistence in industry-wide collective bargaining is plausible because participation in such contracts is unlikely to be a temporary decision.
Participation in an industry-wide contract is mostly linked to a membership in an employers' association, which may not be debated year-by-year. However, the persistency in orientation at collective bargaining is also economically remarkable as there is no formal commitment associated with this wage setting strategy. Concerning CSDs off the diagonal in Table 3 , transitions into industry-wide bargaining contracts (in the third column) are positive and significant for firms with an orientation at collective bargaining, which are 1.5 percentage points more likely covered in the subsequent period compared with uncovered firms of the reference groups. Additionally, firm-specific bargaining contracts are a remarkable stepping stone to industry-wide contracts in that these firms are 3.5 percentage points more likely covered compared with the reference group.
The results in Table 4 should be preferred over Table 3 as these additionally control for potentially confounding covariates. However, the results remain largely unchanged. The effects still show strong positive persistence in bargaining regimes, some evidence for transitions between orientation at collective bargaining and no bargaining coverage (back and forth), and positive transitions from orientation and firm-specific contracts into industry-wide collective bargaining contracts.
[ Table 4 about here]
In a robustness check, I use categorical dummies of the second lag of the bargaining regimes instead of the first lag and calculate TSD and CSD. It ensures that the results are not solely due to year-by-year transitions that are more likely contaminated by measurement error. If the estimated effects were driven by measurement error in a specific year, the effects should vanish when using the second lag. If instead the effects appear to be similar for this alternative lag-structure, measurement issues are less likely to explain the results.
[ Table 5 about here]
The results presented in Table 5 do not point at major differences of the second lag compared with the results in Table 4 A mechanism that may influence the persistence in bargaining regimes and transitions between bargaining regimes are unions. In fact, the literature suggests that participation in collective bargaining may be determined by unions and not only by the employer himself (Gürtzgen 2016) , and empirical findings suggest a positive relationship between bargaining coverage and the propensity of union membership (Fitzenberger et al. 2013 ). Moreover, it seems common sense that works councils want to hamper further deterioration of collective bargaining coverage, and hence, support transitions from such loose regimes without legal commitment into formal bargaining contracts.
[ Table 6 about here]
[ Table 7 about here]
To analyze TSD and CSD depending on the existence of a works council, I conduct separate estimations from separate samples with and without the prevalence of works councils. Table 6 presents effects of the sample with works councils and 
Can transitions reverse the decreasing collective bargaining coverage?
To shed light on whether transitions can reverse the decreasing bargaining coverage, I analyze to what extent the decline in formal participation at collective bargaining is explained by behavioral changes (transitions) or by a changing firm composition. Literature that analyzes the union decline in Britain during the 1980s suggests that the union recognition of existing employers barely changed (Disney et al. 1995) . Instead, the literature shows that newly founded young workplaces restrained from joining collective bargaining, implying that the firm composition rather than changing perceptions explain the overall union decline (Disney et al. 1995; Machin 2000) .
To decompose the German decline in collective bargaining coverage, the participation in each of the bargaining regimes is assigned an establishment-level time-fixed component, in the aggregate representing firm composition, and an establishment-level time-varying component representing behavioral transitions:
separately for all !. This decomposition can be computed by simple demeaning of the total variation " # into an average component and a residual time-varying component, which is achieved by simple establishment fixed effect regression without covariates.
[ Figure 2 about here]
The results are presented in Figure 2 . Table 2 . In some circumstances, transitions may even be in favor of an increasing collective bargaining coverage as presented in Tables 3 to 7 . Leading to a preliminary conclusion, that transitions do not explain the decline in collective bargaining participation. Instead, the increasing use of orientation at collectively bargained wages at the expense of full commitment seems due to different plants in the market.
To explain the driving factors behind the changing establishment composition and hence the use of different bargaining regimes, I apply Blinder-Oaxaca type of decomposition to observable variables in the IAB Establishment Panel (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973) . The twofold decomposition allows splitting the (average) time series of each bargaining state -here from 2001 to 2013 -into an explained part and an unexplained part:
The explained part describes differences in the explanatory variables at both points in time, i.e., the difference in the average values of each explanatory variable is evaluated at the pooled regression coefficient * of the respective variable:
The unexplained part describes the differences in coefficients at the two points in time evaluated at the average covariates' values at the respective points in time:
[ Table 8 about here]
The results are displayed in Table 8 , where each of the columns displays results from a decomposition of one of the bargaining regimes. Column 1 decomposes the rise in orientation at collectively bargained wages, column 2 decomposes decreasing collective bargaining participation, and column 3 shows results from a decomposition of participation in firm-level bargaining.
In column 1, the rise in firm orientation at collectively bargained wages is 6. 
Conclusions
Descriptive time series show a decreasing participation in formal collective bargaining contracts since the early 2000s. At the same time, the fraction of firms covered by firm-specific bargaining contracts remained largely constant, but the fraction of firms that align remuneration at collectively bargained wages without formal contract increased. Similar to Addison et al. (2016) , this increase in orientation at collective bargaining does not fully match the quantitative decrease in formal collective bargaining participation. Moreover, when looking at individual wages along the wage distribution, formally covered firms pay a significant premium over only orientating firms.
When I analyze causal transitions using a multinomial state dependence model that controls for timeconstant firm-specific heterogeneity, the results reveal evidence for true state dependence (i.e, persistency) in each of the bargaining regimes. This state dependence in collective bargaining is much more emphasized in the group of plants that are characterized by worker representation through works councils. Hence, works councils have a moderating function when it comes to the firms' persistence in collective bargaining contracts.
The estimations reveal significantly positive transitions from both orientation at collective bargaining and company-wide bargaining contracts to industry-wide collective bargaining contracts. But these effects are independent of the existence of a works council. Nevertheless, the result of positive transitions is surprising, as it does not correspond with the overall decline in collective bargaining participation. I.e., it rejects the hypothesis that orientation at collectively bargained wages is solely observed on the pathway out of bargaining contracts.
A simple decomposition shows that the decrease in formal bargaining participation is driven by a compositional change of firms in the market rather than behavioral exits. Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions add to this result by demonstrating that the firm composition across industries is a crucial variable that explains a significant fraction of the structural rise in the firms' orientation at collective bargaining participation, i.e., the increasing importance of the service and trade sectors compared to manufacturing and construction. For the decline in collective bargaining participation, international competition faced by exporting firms and the changing workforce composition are additional explanatory factors. While a significant fraction of the compositional change remains unexplained, the export information and the employment structure show that the decline in collective bargaining coverage is not purely a structural change. Instead, market forces faced by different firms operating in the market have some explanatory power.
The results imply that firm-specific bargaining contracts and orientation at collective bargaining serve as important stepping stone institutions leading to transitions into collective industry-wide contracts.
However, the recent rise in orientation will not lead to a sustainable increase in formal coverage rates.
The observed decline is mostly explained by a compositional change and not by transitions in and out of collective bargaining. These results, together with a changing industry composition as well as market forces explaining the shifts in the importance of bargaining regimes, suggest that the observed development over the last 20 years is not easily revertible. The results do not suggest an instructive policy measure that would incentivize firms to enter collective bargaining contracts. It seems that firms seek flexible intuitions such as the orientation at collectively bargained wages without strong commitment. 
Figures and Tables
